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I develop a tractable macro model with endogenous asset liquidity to understand mone-
tary–ﬁscal interactions with liquidity frictions. Agents face idiosyncratic investment risks
and meet ﬁnancial intermediaries in competitive search markets. Asset liquidity is
determined by the search friction and the cost of operating the ﬁnancial intermediaries,
and it drives the ﬁnancing constraints of entrepreneurs (those who have investment
projects) and their ability to invest. In contrast to private assets, government bonds are
fully liquid and can be accumulated in anticipation of future opportunities to invest. A
higher level of real government debt enhances the liquidity of entrepreneurs' portfolios
and raises investment. However, the issuance of debt also raises the cost of ﬁnancing
government expenditures: a higher level of distortionary taxation and/or a higher real
interest rate. A long-run optimal supply of government debt emerges. I also show that a
proper mix of monetary and ﬁscal policies can avoid a deep ﬁnancial recession.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Asset liquidity captures the ease with which ﬁnancial assets can be traded without strongly affecting their prices. The
recent long-lasting world-wide ﬁnancial crisis has shown that liquidity ﬂuctuations in asset markets can have a huge impact
on asset prices and the real economy.1 In fact, empirical evidence points to procyclical variation in the liquidity of a wide
range of ﬁnancial assets.2 Understanding the frictions that generate these ﬂuctuations and the possible policy responses
seems thus crucial.
This paper studies monetary–ﬁscal interactions when movements in asset prices and the real economy are driven by
endogenous ﬂuctuations in liquidity. Although the research on monetary–ﬁscal interactions at least go back to Sargent and
Wallace (1981), Leeper (1991), and Sims (1994),3 the consideration of endogenous liquidity frictions is usually missing.er B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
ics, University College London, 30 Gordon Street, London, WC1H 0AX, the United Kingdom.
y a structural break in the market liquidity of corporate bonds at the onset of the crisis. The liquidity
reased and turnover rates declined, leading to a more difﬁcult reﬁnancing. Commercial papers, mostly
d illiquidity reported by Anderson and Gascon (2009). The main investors in the commercial paper
hly liquid government securities.
rdia et al. (2001, 2005) and Naes et al. (2011) show that market liquidity is procyclical and highly
nds and stocks.
eractions in a new Keynesian framework.
W. Cui / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 1–252To ﬁll this gap, I incorporate these frictions into an almost standard New Keynesian model with sticky prices. In the
model, government bonds are fully liquid and represent public liquidity, while privately issued claims, traded on compe-
titive search markets, are only partially saleable and have a bid-ask spread. Private claims represent private liquidity and
carry a liquidity premium, a premium that buyers will demand when the assets cannot be easily converted into con-
sumption goods at the fair market value.
I show that the government faces a tradeoff between the beneﬁt of public liquidity provision and the cost of ﬁnancing
government expenditures. Therefore, an optimal long-run debt-to-GDP ratio can exist. When the economy is hit by large
adverse ﬁnancial shocks, a proper mix of monetary and ﬁscal policies is the key to stabilize the economy.
In the model, private agents face idiosyncratic investment opportunities and there is no insurance market for idiosyn-
cratic risks. When an investment opportunity arrives, an agent becomes an entrepreneur. Otherwise, she is a worker earning
wages. The entrepreneur can ﬁnance investment by issuing ﬁnancial claims to the new capital stock and/or by liquidating
existing claims. Issuing or reselling private claims needs to go through competitive ﬁnancial intermediaries, which
implement a costly search and matching technology.
The model's innovative aspect is the asset market structure. Asset liquidity is endogenously determined in a competitive
search environment where agents meet ﬁnancial intermediaries. Two important results emerge by endogenizing asset
liquidity. First, the model generates the positive co-movement between asset saleability and asset prices, as observed in the
data. The key aspect is that asset demand is endogenous and determines saleability, tightness of ﬁnancing constraints, and
asset price jointly. Second, government policies can affect the market structure and asset liquidity.
As market- and bank-based ﬁnancial intermediation both share the essential feature of matching savers and borrowers,
our framework admits both interpretations of the intermediation process, as in De-Fiore and Uhlig (2011). The ﬁnancial
frictions, induced by costly search, reduce the amount of resources that are transferred to entrepreneurs with investment
projects. Therefore, if the liquidity of private claims is too low, private agents cannot fully self-insure idiosyncratic risks.
When fully liquid government bonds circulate, private agents will purchase them as a buffer stock in case a good investment
opportunity comes up. Such precautionary savings reduce the real return from bonds and further raise liquidity premium.
I analyze a class of monetary and ﬁscal policy rules with long-run targets suggested by actual policy practice. The
monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate as a function of current inﬂation and output. The ﬁscal authority chooses a
level of tax rate that depends on the quantity of real government debt; it can also adjust government expenditures as a
function of current debt and output.
I ﬁrst study the long-run optimal supply of (real) government debt. The government faces a key tradeoff when supplying
government bonds. On the one hand, more (real) government debt implies more public liquidity, which can be accumulated
by agents awaiting investment opportunities and enhances entrepreneurs' ability to carry out investment when the
opportunity arises. The ﬁnancing constraints are less tight, thus reducing the liquidity premium of private claims and further
encouraging buyers entering the ﬁnancial market. On the other hand, more (real) government debt also implies a higher real
interest rate and/or a higher tax rate, raising the cost of ﬁnancing government expenditures.
After analyzing the long-run economy, I turn to equilibrium dynamics after ﬁnancial shocks. First, I study a simple class of
policy rules in which the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate as an increasing function of inﬂation only and
the ﬁscal authority only adjusts the tax rate but not government expenditures.
Adverse ﬁnancial shocks, modeled as rises in the search costs, drive away the asset demand, reduce the saleability of
private claims, and push down their price. The ﬁnancial shocks affect the bid-ask spread, as in Ajello (2012) and Bassetto
et al. (2015). Adverse ﬁnancial shocks drive up the hedging value of liquid assets and push workers towards them. The
liquidity premium rises and the demand for private claims falls: a ﬂight to liquidity occurs. Entrepreneurs who issue private
claims are even more ﬁnancing constrained. Therefore, demand for goods drops and ﬁrms produce less. Such output
contraction lowers agents' income expectation further, pushing them even more towards liquid assets. We thus see per-
sistent falls in investment, consumption, and output.
Because of less demand for physical investment after adverse ﬁnancial shocks, inﬂation falls and nominal interest rates
drop. When the adverse ﬁnancial shocks are large, the nominal interest rate could drop to the zero lower bound (ZLB). With
nominal frictions, I show that large adverse ﬁnancial shocks combined with the ZLB can generate a much deeper recession,
compared to the case when the ZLB is not a hard constraint.
Finally, I consider a more sophisticated class of policy rules. I allow the nominal interest rate to be a function of both
inﬂation and output, and allow the ﬁscal authority to adjust government expenditures. The optimal policy responses to
ﬁnancial shocks, within this class of monetary and ﬁscal rules, suggest an anticipated expansionary ﬁscal contraction under
which the ZLB does not constrain nominal interest rates. In particular, an anticipated reduction of government expenditures
“crowds in” resources, relaxes entrepreneurs' ﬁnancing constraints, and raises aggregate demand immediately. Compared to
the simple rule, such expansionary ﬁscal contraction (in response to ﬁnancial shocks) implies that the ﬁscal authority should
be more accommodating while the monetary authority needs to be more responsive to inﬂation.
Relationships to literature: This paper analyzes ﬁnancial frictions based on Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) and Shi (2015).4
The large family structure for simple aggregation in this paper also follows Shi (2015). The presence of liquidity constraints
opens up the possibilities for government bonds or ﬁat money to circulate, which at least goes back to Holmström and Tirole4 Similar papers at least include Nezafat and Slavik (2010), Del Negro et al. (2011), Ajello (2012), and Bigio (2012).
W. Cui / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 1–25 3(1998). That is, if private liquidity is not enough, public liquidity can be added to achieve efﬁciency.5 This paper provides a
novel channel in which public liquidity provision is costly due to distortionary taxation. Therefore, an optimal supply of
public liquidity emerges.
Importantly, asset saleability and asset price are endogenously generated from costly search and matching, thus avoiding
the (counterfactual) negative co-movement discussed in Shi (2015) and Bigio (2012) when asset saleability is exogenous.
A drop in asset demand reduces saleability of assets and their prices, thus tightening ﬁnancing constraints. This effect is
similar to that from the random search framework of Cui and Radde (2015), who focus on the fragility of ﬁnancial markets.
For an survey of the literature using search in asset markets, see Rocheteau and Weill (2011) or Lagos et al. (2016).
Since the last ﬁnancial crisis, nominal interest rates in many developed economies have stayed at the ZLB. I show that
why with liquidity frictions adverse ﬁnancial shocks can generate deﬂationary pressures and push nominal interest rates to
the ZLB (when the monetary authority follows a simple Taylor rule). In this regard, this paper is a compliment to Eggertsson
and Krugman (2012) and Buera and Nicolini (2014).
Two sets of policy tools have been proposed to deal with the ZLB. The ﬁrst is unconventional monetary policy or
“Quantitative Easing” (QE).6 Del Negro et al. (2011) demonstrate the large impact of liquidity ﬂuctuation on investment and
asset prices and how unconventional monetary policies might stabilize the economy. The second proposal, such as in
Christiano et al. (2011) and Woodford (2011), argues that raising government expenditures will not crowd out private
consumption when the ZLB binds. I show that even without the consideration of “QE”, the monetary–ﬁscal interactions are
important when the economy features liquidity frictions. Further, after adverse ﬁnancial shocks, ﬁscal expansion might not
be better than ﬁscal contraction which crowds in resources, relaxes ﬁnancing constraints of some private agents, and raises
aggregate demand.
Government debt provides liquidity service and has the “crowding-in” effect, similar to Woodford (1990). This aspect is
in contrast with Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) in which government debt is a perfect substitute to private assets (or capital
stock). Government debt relaxes agents' borrowing constraints but also has the “crowding-out” effect on capital accumu-
lation. In Angeletos et al. (2013), government bonds also “crowd in” resources as they have a higher level of exogenous
pledgeability as collateral than capital assets. This paper, however, features asset saleability (and a bid-ask spread) instead of
asset pledgeability. In addition, I show that public liquidity provision can also alter the liquidity of privately issued claims
through the endogenous search and matching.2. The model
I construct a growth model with liquidity frictions and nominal price stickiness. The economy is populated by a con-
tinuum of similar households (with measure one), ﬁrms, ﬁnancial intermediaries, and a government. Time is discrete and
inﬁnite. Each period is divided into four sub-periods.
(1) The households' decision period. The shocks to aggregate productivity At (TFP shocks) and to intermediation search cost
κt (ﬁnancial shocks) are realized. All members in a representative household equally divide the household's ﬁnancial assets
consisting of government bonds and privately issued ﬁnancial claims on capital stock. The household instructs its members
on the optimal type-speciﬁc choices to be carried out after individual types (explained below) have been realized.
(2) The production period. Each member receives a status draw, becoming an entrepreneur (type i) with a probability χ
and a worker (type n), otherwise. Workers supply labor hours, while only entrepreneurs have access to investment projects
transforming consumption goods into capital stock one-for-one. Intermediate goods ﬁrms, in a monopolistically competitive
market, rent capital stock Kt and labor Nt from the household to produce intermediate products. The after-tax rental rate and
wage rate are rt andWt. Final goods ﬁrms produce numeraire consumption goods by aggregating intermediate products. The
proﬁts (Dt) from intermediate goods ﬁrms are equally distributed among members.
(3) The investment period. There is no insurance among household members, and they keep separated until the con-
sumption stage. Because of the equal division of assets in the beginning, entrepreneurs are ﬁnancing constrained in
investment. They seek outside ﬁnancing. Financial markets open in which entrepreneurs offer ﬁnancial claims for sale and
workers purchase these claims through ﬁnancial intermediaries, which implement a costly search and matching technology.
Search frictions imply that private ﬁnancial claims are only partially liquid. In contrast, government bonds are fully liquid as
they can be traded on a frictionless spot market.
Financial intermediaries are competitive and search in ﬁnancial submarkets. Entrepreneurs and workers choose the best
ﬁnancial market subject to the participation constraints of ﬁnancial intermediaries. The competitive search process shares
similar features with that in the labor search literature such as Moen (1997).5 There are thus both fully liquid government issued assets and partially liquid private claims. Changing the portfolio compositions of the two assets
can potentially affect the real economy. More recently, ﬁnancial intermediations are added and the policy affects the asset compositions held by inter-
mediaries. See, for example, Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
6 “QE” here stands for exchanging government issued liquid assets (money or short-term government bonds) for privately issued and partially liquid
assets to increase liquidity in asset markets, i.e., unconventional monetary policy. The policy was implemented via various facilities in “Quantitative Easing
I” and some parts of “Quantitative Easing III”. See a recent summary by Blanchard (2013). Recently, Wen (2014) compares equilibrium responses when the
exit strategy of “QE” is implemented differently.
W. Cui / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 1–254(4) The consumption period. Entrepreneurs and workers reunite again in their respective households, pool all assets
together, and share consumption goods across all members.
Throughout the paper, I focus on the type of equilibrium in which entrepreneurs are ﬁnancing constrained and both
private claims and government bonds circulate. I verify the existence of such type of equilibrium in the numerical analysis.
2.1. A representative household
Preferences. Let Et be the mathematical expectations operator conditional on all information available at date t. The
household's preferences on consumption and leisure can be represented by
E0
X1
t ¼ 0
βt
C1σt 1
1σ Z
1σ
t μNtþψ g
G1σt 1
1σ
" #
ð1Þ
where βAð0;1Þ is a discount factor, σ40 is a risk-aversion parameter, Ct denotes private consumption, and μ and ψg are
constants that scale the disutility from hours worked Nt and the utility of public spending Gt. The linear disutility of labor
follows the employment lottery technology from Rogerson (1988) so that the micro-level labor supply elasticity is not a
concern. To allow for a balanced growth path, the disutility from labor is adjusted by Zt, the level of labor augmenting
technology which grows at a constant rate Zt=Zt1 ¼ γz. The scaling Z1σt follows Mertens and Ravn (2011) and could be
motivated by the fact that leisure time becomes more valuable as technology improves recreational activities.
Balance sheet. Households hold Bt units of nominal and fully liquid government bonds, earning a nominal interest rate
Rt1. The nominal price level is Pt. In addition, physical capital Kt1, earning the rental return rt, is owned by households
and depreciates to ð1δÞKt1 at the end of each period t, where δAð0;1Þ. There is a ﬁnancial claim to the future return of
every unit of capital. For example, the owner of one unit of claims issued at time t1 is entitled to rt at t, ð1δÞrtþ1 at time
tþ1, ð1δÞ2rtþ2 at time tþ2, and so on. For simplicity, I follow Kiyotaki and Moore (2012), who normalize the claims by the
capital stock, such that all claims depreciate at the same rate δ and earn a return rtþ s at any date tþs (8sZ0).
Hence, the representative household owns a portfolio of bonds, private claims issued by other households, and the
fraction of their own capital stock which has not been issued to others (Table 1). New claims have the same liquidity as
claims already issued, since both new claims (to unissued capital) and existing claims would need to be traded on the same
search market. Therefore, besides liquid assets Bt, we only need to keep track of net private claims deﬁned as
St  claims on others0 capital stockþunissued capital stock
Note that there is no currency, which is another form of public liquidity in practice. One can give ﬁat money an extra role,
for example, by having money in the utility of the household. Nevertheless, a higher level of money or government debt
does not necessarily mean more liquidity. Public liquidity here means real liquidity which has to be eventually backed by the
government's primary surplus. What is important is the real value of liquidity, whether it is in the form of government
bonds or in the form of money. For this reason and for simplicity, I mix government bonds and money.
Asset accumulation. As mentioned before, only entrepreneurs can invest in capital stock. Investment Xt at time t will be
available as capital stock in period tþ1: Kt ¼ ð1δÞKt1þXt .
No insurance market exists for idiosyncratic investment opportunities. To ﬁnance the investment, an entrepreneur can
issue private claims to the future output from the investment. Alternatively, they can sell existing claims. Both new issuance
and reselling go through ﬁnancial intermediaries with a costly search and matching technology, and only an endogenous
fraction ϕtA ð0;1Þ (i.e., asset saleability) of new or existing assets can be successfully sold with a price qt
i
. Buyers (who turn
out to be the workers) need to pay a price qnt 4q
i
t because of the search costs.
Let S jt1 and B
j
t1 denote the total net private claims and bonds belonging to type jAfi;ng members at the beginning of
period t. As all assets are equally divided among members,
Sit1 ¼ χSt1; Snt1 ¼ ð1χÞSt1; Bit1 ¼ χBt1; and Bnt1 ¼ ð1χÞBt1 ð2Þ
by the law of large numbers. Let St
j
and Bt
j
denote the end-of-period total net private claims and bonds for type jmembers. As
household members pool assets together at the end of period t, we know that
St ¼ SitþSnt and Bt ¼ BitþBnt ð3ÞTable 1
Balance sheet of a household.
Asset Liability þ net worth
Government bonds Claims issued to others
Claims on others' capital stock
Own capital stock Net worth
W. Cui / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 1–25 5Household members face two ﬁnancing constraints. First, no private agent can issue government bonds, i.e.,
BjtZ0 ð4Þ
The second constraint relates to the accumulation of private claims. For each group j, the position of net private claims
evolves according to
Sjt ¼ ð1δÞSjt1þXjtMjt ð5Þ
where Xt
j
is the level of investment, and Mt
j
denotes the units of private claims sold on the ﬁnancial market. Due to search
frictions, agents need to retain at least a fraction 1ϕt
 
of their existing private claims and of new investment, thus
limiting the external funding for new investment. Then, (5) implies the second ﬁnancing constraint:
SjtZ ð1ϕtÞ Xjtþð1δÞSjt1
h i
ð6Þ
The workers' ﬂow-of-funds constraint. All workers are the same, and the worker group does not invest (Xnt ¼ 0). They
accumulate ﬁnancial assets (Mnt o0 and Bnt 40) to implement their household's intertemporal consumption smoothing plan.
As a result, neither of their ﬁnancing constraints is binding. They use labor incomeWtNt , the return on private claims (S
n
t1)
and bonds (Bnt1), and proﬁts from intermediate goods ﬁrms D
n
t ¼ ð1χÞDt , to ﬁnance consumption Ct
n
and the end-of-
period portfolio of private claims (St
n
) and bonds (Bt
n
):
Cnt þqnt Snt þ
Bnt
Pt
¼WtNtþ rtþqnt ð1δÞ
 
Snt1þ
Rt1B
n
t1
Pt
þDnt ð7Þ
where private claims are purchased at the price qt
n
, while government bonds are valued in real terms by 1=Pt .
The entrepreneurs' ﬂow-of-funds constraint. The entrepreneur group needs to ﬁnance new investment Xit40. They can use
return on private claims (St
i
) and bonds (Bit1), the issuance (or reselling) of private claims M
i
t ¼ Xitþð1δÞSit1Sit , and
dividends from ﬁrms Dit ¼ χDt , to ﬁnance consumption Ct
i
, new bonds Bt
i
, and physical investment Xt
i
:
Citþ
Bit
Pt
þXit ¼ rtSit1þ
Rt1B
i
t1
Pt
þqit Xitþð1δÞSit1Sit
h i
þDit ð8Þ
where private claims are issued or resold at the price qt
i
. It is worth noting that qt
i
is also equal to Tobin's q: the ratio of the market
value of capital to the replacement cost (i.e., unity). As long as qit41, entrepreneurs will use all available resources to create new
capital. We shall see that qit41, when ϕ is sufﬁciently larger than zero and sufﬁciently smaller than one. This is realistic, as
privately issued assets such as corporate bonds and equity claims are neither sufﬁciently illiquid nor sufﬁciently liquid.
Then, both ﬁnancing constraints (4) and (6) bind, and entrepreneurs do not bring consumption goods back to their
household, i.e., Cit ¼ 0. Hence, Sit ¼ ð1ϕtÞ Xitþð1δÞχSt1
h i
according to (6), and investment can be written as
Xit ¼ Sit=ð1 ϕtÞ  ð1 δÞχSt1. Then, the entrepreneurs' ﬂow-of-funds constraint (8) becomes
qrt S
i
t ¼
Rt1B
i
t1
Pt
þ rtþð1δÞ
 
Sit1þDit ð9Þ
where qrt 
1ϕtqit
1ϕt
o1 ð10Þ
The right-hand side of (9) is entrepreneurs' total net worth. On the left-hand side, the end-of-period private claims are
valued at qt
r
, which is the effective replacement cost of capital: for every unit of new investment, a ϕt fraction is issued at the
price qt
i
; entrepreneurs need to make a “down-payment” (1ϕtqit) and retain a fraction (1ϕt) as inside equity claims. The
lower qt
r
is, the larger St
i
is and entrepreneurs can bring more private claims back to the household.
Once we know St
i
from (9), aggregate investment Xt ¼ Xit ¼ Sit=ð1 ϕtÞ  ð1 δÞχSt1 can be backed out as
Xt ¼
rtþð1δÞϕtqit
 
χSt1þχRt1Bt1=PtþχDt
1ϕtqit
ð11Þ
Eq. (11) says that entrepreneurs' liquid net worth, including return from private claims and bonds, dividends, and the
saleable part of existing claims 1 δð ÞϕtqitχSt1 can be “leveraged” with a factor ð1ϕtqitÞ1 to invest in new capital. One can
see that a drop of asset saleability ϕt or asset price qt
i
reduces investment. Investment also falls when the (real) public
liquidity Rt1Bt1=Pt drops.
2.2. The household's problem
Deﬁne ρt as the ratio of the purchasing price qt
n
and the effective replacement cost qt
r
ρt 
qnt
qrt
¼ ð1ϕtÞq
n
t
1ϕtqit
ð12Þ
W. Cui / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 1–256This ratio measures the degree of ﬁnancial frictions. ρt ¼ 1 in a standard real business cycle model or a standard New
Keynesian model since qnt ¼ qit ¼ qrt ¼ 1. With ﬁnancial frictions, qnt 41 and qrto1 such that ρt41. Then, using (2) and
St ¼ SitþSnt and Bt ¼ Bnt from (3), I derive a household budget constraint by using ð7Þ  ρtþð9Þ
CþqnSþB
P
¼WNþ χρþ1χ  rS1þR1B1P þD
 
þ χρþð1χÞqn  1δ S1 ð13Þ
where the time subscript t of each variable is omitted. Note that ρ indeed captures ﬁnancial frictions caused by liquidity
risks. When ρ¼ 1, (13) is a standard budget constraint. When ρ41, it is a liquidity-adjusted budget constraint.
From now on, I stick to this recursive formulation without the time subscript t. Let Γ be the collection of aggregate state
variables and the government policy variables (speciﬁed later). Given Γ, a representative household chooses consumption C,
hours worked N, and a portfolio of private claims S and government bonds B, to maximize the expected utility. Speciﬁcally,
given Γ, let JðS1;B1;ΓÞ be the value (excluding the value of public spending) of a household with private claims S1 and
bonds B1. Let u Cð Þ  C
1 σ 1
1σ , and the household solves the following Bellman equation
JðS1;B1;ΓÞ ¼ max
C;N;S;B
uðCÞZ1σμNþβE½JðS;B;Γþ1; ÞjΓ
n o
; s:t: ð13Þ
I now derive the optimal choices of the household. The following ﬁrst-order necessary conditions are also sufﬁcient due
to the concavity of the objective function. The ﬁrst-order condition for labor is
Wu0ðCÞ ¼ Z1σμN ð14Þ
which implies a standard intra-period tradeoff: the marginal gain fromworking which brings more consumption need to be
equalized with the marginal cost from disutility of working.
The ﬁrst-order condition for St is
E Δþ1 χρþ1r
ni
þ1þð1χÞrnnþ1
h i
jΓ
h i
¼ 1; ð15Þ
where Δþ1 
βu0 Cþ1ð Þ
u0 Cð Þ ; r
ni
þ1 
rþ1þ 1−δð Þ
qn
; and rnnþ1 
rþ1þ 1−δð Þqnþ
qn
Δþ1 is the stochastic discount factor, and rniþ1 and r
nn
þ1 resemble the workers' internal returns on private claims, if they (who
are not ﬁnancing constrained at date t) become entrepreneurs and workers at date tþ1, respectively. From the ﬂow-of-
funds constraints at date tþ1, the entrepreneurs' valuation of 1 unit of private claims is 1, while the workers' valuation is
qþ . Since χρþ1rniþ1þð1χÞrnnþ1 is the household's internal return with the adjustment of ρþ1 representing liquidity risks,
Eq. (15) is a liquidity-adjusted asset pricing formula for private claims.
Following similar steps, I derive another asset pricing formula for government bonds. Let inﬂation be deﬁned as
Π þ1 
Pþ1
P
Then, R=Π þ1 is the real return on bonds, and the ﬁrst-order condition for B is
E Δþ1
R χρþ1þ1χ
 
Π þ1
 				Γ


¼ 1 ð16Þ
where similarly R χρþ 1 þ1χð ÞΠ þ 1 is the household's internal return on government bonds. With the adjustment of ρþ1, Eq. (16) is
a liquidity-adjusted asset pricing formula for government bonds.
2.3. Asset price and asset liquidity
Search and matching. There are capital submarkets, denoted by superscripts m¼ 1;2;3;…. As we shall see, the number of
submarkets is not important. On each submarket, entrepreneurs and workers post Um units of sell quotes and Vm units of
buy quotes, respectively. If matched, intermediaries ensure that buyers have enough resources to ﬁll buy quotes and sell
quotes Um need to be backed by private claims (i.e.,
P
mU
mrXþð1δÞχS1).
There is a continuum of competitive ﬁnancial intermediaries, each of which chooses on which submarket to collect and
match quotes at per-quote costs of κ units of consumption goods. The probability of ﬁlling a buy quote is fm, while the
probability of ﬁlling a sell quote (or asset saleability) is ϕm.
On each submarket m, ﬁnancial intermediaries' gross proﬁt amounts to the difference between the competitive buy price qn;m
collected from workers and the sell price qi;m paid to entrepreneurs on the fraction of successfully matched quotes. Notice that
workers direct their quotes to the submarket with the lowest buy price qn;m ¼ qn, which is taken as given by intermediaries.
Since ﬁnancial intermediaries operate in a competitive environment, they earn zero (net) proﬁt from each transaction,
i.e., κ 1
f m
þ 1
ϕm
 
¼ qn;mqi;m. In light of this zero-proﬁt condition, intermediaries are indifferent between all submarkets and
we can omit the superscript m:
κ
1
f
þ 1
ϕ
 
¼ qnqi ð17Þ
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function
MðU;VÞ ¼ ξUηV1η
where ξ captures matching efﬁciency and η is the matching elasticity with respect to sell quotes U. Then, asset saleability and the
probability of ﬁlling buy quotes are
ϕMðU;VÞ
U
; f MðU;VÞ
V
¼ ξ 11 ηϕ
η
η 1 ð18Þ
To maximize external funding via the ﬁnancial market, entrepreneurs post quotes amounting to U ¼ Xþð1δÞχS1, of which a
fraction ϕU ¼M is sold. In this sense, ϕ indeed captures asset saleability. Similarly, workers post total quotes V ¼
f 1 Snð1χÞð1δÞS1
 
and they have enough resources to ﬁll matched buy quotes.
Asset price. While the matching function links ϕ and f through condition (18), the zero-proﬁt condition (17) links qi and
qn. Given these constraints, each submarket is characterized by its saleability-sell-price combination ϕ; qi
 
. Accordingly,
entrepreneurs choose the submarket in which to post their sell offers, which minimizes the effective replacement cost qr,
subject to the zero-proﬁt condition and the relationship between f and ϕ:
min
0rϕr1; qiZ1f g
qr ¼ 1ϕq
i
1ϕ ; s:t: ð17Þ and ð18Þ
This maximizes the end-of-period Si, according to the entrepreneurs' ﬂow-of-funds constraint (9). If we assume an interior
solution, the optimal solution (see Appendix B) yields
qi ¼ 1þκ 1þη 1ϕ
 
1η f  1ϕ
" #
ð19Þ
Notice that qi41, if κ40 and ϕ is neither too close to zero nor too close to one. Intuitively, private claims cannot be too
illiquid, otherwise entrepreneurs do not enter the ﬁnancial market; private claims cannot be too liquid, otherwise qi
becomes one and entrepreneurs are not ﬁnancing constrained.
2.4. Firms
The production sector consists of intermediate goods ﬁrms and ﬁnal goods ﬁrms, as in a standard New Keynesian model such as
in Leeper et al. (2012) and references therein. To simplify, I only incorporate sticky prices using the Calvo type of price adjustment.
The ﬁnal goods ﬁrms produce ﬁnal consumption goods Y by assembling intermediate products Yi (iA ½0;1, with a slight
abuse of notation) into Y ¼ R 10 Y1=ð1þζÞi dih i1þζ , where ζ is related to the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods.
Denote Pi as the nominal price of intermediate good i. The demand for intermediate inputs is then Yi ¼ Y Pi=P
  1þ ζð Þ=ζ ,
which gives rise to the aggregate price level P ¼ R P1=ζi di ζ .
Each intermediate ﬁrm i produces Yi by renting capital ki and employing labor hours ni according to a constant-return-to-
scale (CRS) production technology
Yi ¼ Akαi ðZniÞ1α;
Z
Z1
¼ γz
where capital share αAð0;1Þ. A is the stationary aggregate productivity (TFP), while Z is again the labor augmenting
technology that grows at a rate γz.
Each ﬁrm i solves the cost-minimization problem in renting capital and labor inputs
min
ki ;ni
f~rkiþ ~Wnig s:t: Yi ¼ Akαi ðZniÞ1α
where ~r and ~W are the before-tax rental rate and wage rate. Let λ be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the con-
straint, which is also the marginal cost of producing Yi. Then, ﬁrm i that rents capital ki hires labor hours ni ¼ λ 1αð ÞAZ~W
h i1
α
ki=Z.
Given the aggregate capital stock K1, the aggregate labor demand is
λ 1αð ÞAZ
~W
h i1
α
K 1=Z. Since the aggregate labor supply is N,
the before-tax wage rate and rental rate are
~W ¼ λ 1αð ÞAZ K 1
ZN
 α
and ~r ¼ λαA K 1
ZN
 α1
ð20Þ
Thanks to the CRS technology, the capital-labor ratio in each intermediate ﬁrm is the same. This fact implies that the ﬁnal
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Y ¼
Z 1
0
Y1=ð1þζÞi di
" #1þζ
¼ AKα1ðZNÞ1α and D¼ ð1λÞAKα1ðZNÞ1α
In the monopolistically competitive market, each intermediate ﬁrm i can change price with a probability 1ψ , where
ψA ð0;1Þ. Otherwise, the price Pi will be indexed to the (gross) trend inﬂation rate Π , i.e., Pi ¼ Pi;1Π . Following the tra-
dition, I look for a symmetric equilibrium in which ﬁrms that can adjust prices set the same P. Then, from
P ¼ R P1=ζi dih iζ , I can rewrite the aggregate price level P as
P ¼ ð1ψ Þ Pð Þ1=ζþψ ðP1Π Þ1=ζ
h iζ
ð21Þ
When setting P, each ﬁrm i maximizes proﬁts conditioning on the future dates when it cannot adjust. The optimal P
satisﬁes the following recursive conditions (see Appendix B)
P
P
¼ 1þζ H1
H2
; H1 ¼ λYþψE Δþ1
Π þ1
Π
 1þ ζ
ζ
H1þ1 Γ
#
; and H2 ¼ YþψE Δþ1
Π þ1
Π
 1
ζ
H2þ1 Γ
#					
"					
"
where Δþ1 again is the household's stochastic discount factor. By using (21), I further eliminate P and P and obtain the New
Keynesian Phillips curve with forward-looking inﬂation
1¼ 1 ψð Þ 1þζð ÞH
1
H2
" #1=ζ
þψ Π
Π
 !1=ζ
ð22Þ
2.5. Government policies and the transformed economy
The government follows policy rules which are taken as given by private agents. I restrict to a class of policy rules that
have long-run targets and induce a balanced growth path. For this reason, the “long-run equilibrium”, the “steady state”,
and the “balanced-growth path” are used interchangeably.
Along the balanced growth path, all quantity variables (except labor hours N) and wage rate grows at the same rate γz,
while interest rate, inﬂation, and asset price are constants. Since Z grows, I deﬂate all quantity variables (except N) by Z. That
is, c¼C/Z, g¼G/Z, x¼X/Z, y¼Y/Z, and so on. Asset position variables are predetermined, and the detrended asset positions
are s1 ¼ S1=Z and k1 ¼ K 1=Z. For convenience, I deﬁne the real value of government debt as
Br;1 
B1
P1
and similarly br;1 ¼ Br;1=Z. Let the steady-state level of an arbitrary variable z be z. In particular, the long-run policy
targets are g , τy, R, and Π .
Monetary and ﬁscal policies. The monetary authority sets the predetermined nominal interest rate R for tþ1. The ﬁscal
authority spends g and sets a value-added tax rate τy on total output y. This tax policy is equivalent to taxing capital returns,
wages, and dividends at the common ﬂat rate τy. The after-tax rental rate, wage rate, and dividends are
r¼ ð1τyÞ~r ; w¼ ð1τyÞ ~w; and d¼ ð1τyÞð1λÞy ð23Þ
Importantly, I do not allow lump-sum taxes and transfers which might potentially eliminate liquidity frictions. In practice, it
is perhaps hard to verify investment opportunities, and that is why the government cannot simply eliminate liquidity
frictions by taxes and transfers.
Institution settings. I consider policy rules (with long-run targets) which respond to economic ﬂuctuations. Speciﬁcally,
R
R
¼ Π
Π
 ψRΠ y
y
 ψRy
;
g
g
¼ br
br
 ψ gb y
y
 ψgy
; and
τy
τy
¼ br
br
 ψτb
ð24Þ
The long-run targets g , τy, R, and Π maximizes the steady-state social welfare, which will be discussed later. Note that (24)
seems to be a class of rules suggested by actual policies. The monetary authority reacts to inﬂation and output ﬂuctuations,
while the ﬁscal authority can adjust government expenditures according to the current level of (real) debt and output.
Finally, the tax rule mainly reﬂects the stabilizing role.
2.6. Recursive equilibrium
Now, I close the model by deﬁning the recursive equilibrium. Readers who are not interested in the technical deﬁnition
can skip this subsection.
I impose the equity market clearing s ¼ k and avoid discussing s. It is helpful to implement a few transformations before
the equilibrium deﬁnition. First, the household's optimal labor supply and portfolio choice (14)–(16) can be transformed to
cσw¼ μ ð25Þ
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βγσz c
σ
þ1
cσ
χρþ1
rþ1þð1δÞ
qn
þ 1χ rþ1þð1δÞqnþ
qn
 

Γ


¼ 1
				

ð26Þ
E
βγσz c
σ
þ1
cσ
R χρþ1þ1χ
 
Π þ1
Γ


¼ 1
				

ð27Þ
where I have used the properties of uð:Þ. Further, the household budget constraint becomes
cþqnγzkþγzbr ¼wNþ χρþð1χÞ
 
rk1þ
R1br;1
Π
þ 1τy  1λ y 
þ χρþð1χÞqn  1δ k1 ð28Þ
and aggregate investment in (11) becomes
x¼ χ rþq
iϕ 1δ  k1þR1br;1=Πþð1τyÞð1λÞy
1ϕqi ð29Þ
where I have transformed the dividends by using (23). Second, I further transform the optimal nominal price setting in (22)
to
1¼ 1ψ  1þζ h1
h2
" #1=ζ
þψ Π
Π
" #1=ζ
ð30Þ
h1 ¼ λyþE βψγ
σ
z c
σ
þ1
cσ
Πþ1
Π
 1þ ζ
ζ
h1þ Γ
#
; and h2 ¼ yþE βψγ
σ
z c
σ
þ1
cσ
Πþ1
Π
 1
ζ
h2þ Γ
#					
"					
"
ð31Þ
where the total output satisﬁes y¼ Akα1N1α. Finally, notice that the total transaction of new issuance and reselling in the
asset market is ϕ xþ 1 δð Þχk1
 
; for each unit of transaction, the cost is κðϕ1þ f 1Þ ¼ qnqi. Then, the social resources
constraint can be written as
cþgþxþðqnqiÞϕ xþð1δÞχk1
 ¼ y ð32Þ
Now, I deﬁne the recursive equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 1. A recursive competitive equilibrium is an allocation in the private sector (k, br, c, x, N, y) and a price system (w, r,
λ, ϕ, ρ, qn, qi, Π, h1, h2) as a function of (k1, br;1, R1), given the exogenous stochastic processes ðκ;AÞ-ðκþ1;Aþ1Þ, the
policy rules (24), and the long-run policy targets ðg ; τy; R; Π Þ, such that Γ  fZ; κ;A; k1;R1; br;1; g; τy;Rg and
1. the household's optimality conditions (25)–(27) and the budget constraint (28) hold; physical investment x is given by (29);
2. ﬁrms' pricing behaviors satisfy (30) and (31), with the after-tax rental rate and wage rate given by r¼ ð1τyÞλαy=k1 and
w¼ ð1τyÞλð1αÞy=N;
3. the ﬁnancial market equilibrium conditions (17) and (19) are satisﬁed, with ρ given by (12);
4. the goods market clearing condition (32) and the capital market clearing condition x¼ γzkð1δÞk1 are satisﬁed, with
output y given by y¼ Akα1N1α.
To check that the market for government bonds clears, i.e., Walras law holds, one should derive the government budget
constraint from the equilibrium conditions. I use the investment equation (29), and I subtract the household budget con-
straint (28) from the social resources constraint (32). Then, I reach the government budget constraint
gþR1br;1
Π
¼ τyyþγzbr or Gþ
R1B1
P
¼ τyYþB
P
ð33Þ
That is, the government uses taxes and the new debt issuance to ﬁnance the public spending and the repayment of
existing debt.3. Liquidity premium and the cost of public liquidity provision
In this section, I characterize the equilibrium analytically.
First, I show that in equilibrium in which κ40 and both private claims and government bonds circulate, private claims
carry a liquidity premium. Intuitively, private claims are subject to search costs while government bonds are not.
The government can provide public liquidity (real government debt) to mitigate the liquidity frictions. When private
liquidity is in shortage due to the search frictions, public liquidity can be used as an alternative. A higher level of public
liquidity means that entrepreneurs with government bonds become richer and can invest more, according to the investment
equation (11). It can also reduces the liquidity premium through the endogenous search market structure, as entrepreneurs
rely less on the outside ﬁnancing.
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government sets long run targets, it faces the tradeoff between the beneﬁt of public liquidity provision and the cost of
government ﬁnancing.
3.1. Liquidity premium and asset price
Private claims are not as liquid as government bonds, since 0oϕto1 and qnt 4qit . Government bonds provide a liquidity
service if liquidity frictions matter, i.e., ρt41. Taking government bonds as the benchmark assets, I compute the premium of
private claims as
ΔLPt  Et χ
rtþ1þð1δÞ
qnt
þ 1χ rtþ1þð1δÞqntþ1
qnt
 

Et
Rt
Πtþ1
 

which is the difference between expected returns of the two assets. In the steady state, ΔLP only contains liquidity premium
and is positive.
Proposition 1. Suppose κ40 and both private claims and government bonds circulate. Government bonds provide a liquidity
service in a neighborhood around the steady state. The steady-state liquidity premium of private claims relative to government
bonds amounts to
Δ
LP ¼ 1χ  1ρ1  1δ  χρ
χρþ1χ 1
1
qn
 
40 ð34Þ
Proof. See Appendix B. □
One can see that when qn is ﬁxed, the liquidity premium Δ
LP
in (34) is an increasing function of ρ. When there are no
liquidity frictions on the balanced growth path, qn ¼ qi ¼ qr ¼ 1 and thus ρ ¼ 1. That is, the liquidity premium becomes zero,
and government bonds and private claims can act as perfect substitutes.
Asset saleability ϕ and the purchase price qn determine the liquidity premium. To illustrate, when Tobin's q or the selling
price qi41, we know that qn4qi414qr . Entrepreneurs are ﬁnancing constrained and ρ41. Liquidity frictions matter,
and an additional unit of government bonds can relax entrepreneurs' constraints by raising their net worth according to
(11). This allows them to leverage their physical investment and eventually their future equity positions. In sum, govern-
ment bonds provide liquidity service, and private claims carry a liquidity premium.
Now, I study the relationship between asset saleability and asset price. One shall see that whether a lower level of the
equilibrium saleability ϕ is associated with a higher or a lower asset price qi depends on the relative strength of asset supply
and demand effects.
On one hand, a lower level of ϕ implies tighter ﬁnancing constraints and less supply relative to demand on the asset
search market as shown by Shi (2015). Then, the shadow value of private claims rises. As intermediaries have to offer better
conditions to attract scarce supply, this should be reﬂected in a higher equilibrium asset price. On the other hand, lower
equilibrium asset saleability implies that private claims are less effective investments to hedge future funding needs, which
would reduce demand, increase the equilibrium liquidity premium, and compress the asset price.
Which effect dominates depends on the parameters of the economy. But I can show that qi must fall, if the spread qnqi
is higher when asset saleability ϕ drops.
Proposition 2. Suppose κ40 and both private claims and government bonds circulate. If we have the negative co-movement
between asset saleability and bid-ask spread, i.e., ∂ qnqi =∂ϕo0, then we have the positive co-movement of asset saleability
and Tobin's q, i.e., ∂qi=∂ϕ40.
Proof. See Appendix B. □
The above proposition is a partial equilibrium result, but carries the insight from asset market structure into general
equilibrium analysis later. That is, when a drop of asset saleability ϕ increases the spread, the liquidity premium channel
dominates the drop of supply. Tobin's q falls in response. To generate the fall in asset price, one can see that the crucial
component is the spread κ f 1þϕ1
 
which is linked with asset saleability. This component, which is endogenous, allows
demand to play an important role to affect asset prices. In contrast, ϕ is an exogenous parameter in the Kiyotaki and Moore
(2012) model and asset demand is ﬁxed to clear the asset market.
3.2. Costly public liquidity provision
Since private claims do not have enough liquidity, the government can provide public liquidity to mitigate liquidity
frictions. But public liquidity provision is costly, as there is a tradeoff between the beneﬁt of public liquidity provision and
the cost of government ﬁnancing.
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ρ¼ 1þχ1 βR
Π
 !1
γσz  1
2
4
3
5
A higher real interest rate implies a lower ρ. Since ρ qn=qr , we know that if ρ falls, the difference between the values of
private claims from the perspective of workers and entrepreneurs shrinks. That is, the degree of ﬁnancial frictions is smaller.
However, the real interest rate cannot be arbitrarily large. As ρ41 when κ40, the real interest rate is bounded above
R
Π
oβ1γσz
To be speciﬁc, due to liquidity frictions, the monetary authority prefers a lower ρ, or a higher real interest rate RΠ-1 up to
β1γσz . Then, entrepreneurs who have accumulated government bonds for precautionary saving purposes can invest more
according to (29).
Intuitively, since private claims carry a liquidity premium and government bonds are scarce, precautionary entrepreneurs
tend to push down the real interest rate compared to the case without liquidity frictions. Consequently, the (real) price of
bonds are unnecessarily high, and the government needs to supply more real government debt. Given a qn, this public
liquidity provision also reduces the liquidity premium in (34), as entrepreneurs rely less on the ﬁnancial market but more on
public liquidity. In later numerical analysis, I will show that these effects still hold in general equilibrium.
The above discussion suggests that liquidity premium has a negative impact on ﬁnancing investment. On the contrary, if
government expenditures need to be ﬁnanced at the same time, some degree of liquidity premium is preferred by the ﬁscal
authority. One possible way to see this is that, a higher real interest rate implies that government expenditures become
more expensive to ﬁnance. With a higher real interest rate, the government with a high level of real government debt will
have to either cut government expenditures (which reduces the social welfare that depends on public spending), or raise
more distortionary taxation.
To simplify, consider the economy where the tax rate τy is ﬁxed. Along the balanced growth path, how should the
government choose the optimal level of debt, or the debt-to-GDP ratio (br=y)? Given a tax rate τy, the planner faces a key
tradeoff. On the beneﬁt side, government bonds enhances the liquidity of entrepreneurs' portfolio. A higher level of (real)
debt can raise investment from entrepreneurs who sell liquid assets to invest. On the cost side, a higher interest rate pushes
up the cost of ﬁnancing government expenditures which can be seen from the government budget constraint (33) on the
balanced growth path:
g
y
¼ τyþ γz
R
Π
 !
br
y
; ð35Þ
when br=y increases, the real interest rate RΠ
1
rises to clear the market for government bonds, which mitigates liquidity
frictions. If RΠ
1
is higher than the growth rate γz, government expenditures have to be cut with a further rise of br=y. As a
result, there might exist an optimal debt-to-GDP ratio to balance the beneﬁt and the cost of public liquidity provision.
As illustrated before, there is no money (which is another form of public liquidity in practice). It should be clear now that
printing money or printing government bonds is not equivalent to providing liquidity. Public liquidity here means real
liquidity which has to be eventually backed by primary surplus (the difference between τyy and g) suggested by the
government budget constraint (35). If the present value of primary surplus is not enough, then either the nominal price level
or the real interest rate adjust which is essentially captured in this paper. For this reason and for simplicity, I mix
government bonds and money.4. The optimal quantities of debt in the long run
The net effect of government debt on welfare is hard to be shown analytically. This section illustrates the optimal choice
of government debt by numerical simulations. In particular, I calibrate the model to the data with long run targets g , τy, R,
and Π which give rise to a particular debt-to-GDP ratio. Then, I discuss the welfare gains/losses with different debt-to-GDP
ratios.
4.1. Calibration
The model is calibrated in quarterly frequency to match several US long-run statistics. The calculation of steady state can
be found in Appendix A.
The relative risk-aversion, the depreciation rate, and the discount factor are standard (see Table 2). Capital share α targets
16% investment-to-GDP ratio. Investment includes physical investment and intermediation search costs. I choose μ such that
the hours worked are 25% of total hours. 6% of household members are entrepreneurs (χ ¼ 0:06) and have investment
projects every quarter, which is the number to match investment spikes observed from U.S. manufacturing plants in Doms
and Dunne (1998) and Cooper et al. (1999).
Table 2
Baseline calibration.
Parameter Baseline value Target/source
Preferences and production technology
Household discount factor β 0.9900 Exogenous
Relative risk aversion σ 2 Exogenous
Utility weight on leisure μ 6.1555 Working time: 25%
Utility weight on G ψg 0.4586 Maximizing the steady-state welfare
Mass of entrepreneurs χ 0.0600 Doms and Dunne (1998)
Depreciation rate of capital δ 0.0250 Exogenous
Capital share of output α 0.3880 Investment-to-GDP ratio: 16%
Growth rate γz 1.0045 Annualized growth rate: 1.8%
Search and matching
Supply elasticity η 0.5000 Tobins q¼1.0600
Matching efﬁciency ξ 0.1146 Saleability ϕ¼0.1904
Search costs κ 0.0080 Liquidity premium¼91.6 basis points
Price stickiness
Markup ζ 0.1667 Elasticity of substitution: 7
Calvo probability ψ 0.7500 Frequency of adjusting price: 4 quarters
Government ﬁnancing
Government expenditures g 0.1521 g=y¼0.22
Government tax τy 0.2203 br=y¼0.60
Inﬂation Π 1.0025 Annualized inﬂation¼1%
Nominal interest rate R 1.0075 Annualized real interest rate¼2%
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nesian literature. I set the Calvo parameter ψ ¼ 0:75, which is another conventional value and implies that on average ﬁrms
change price every year.
The annual growth rate of the US per capita GDP is about 1.8% so that γz ¼ 1:0045. I set the steady-state government
expenditures share of GDP to be 22%, which is in line with the post-war sample. I use 2% annualized real return on gov-
ernment bonds because I do not distinguish government bonds with different maturities. Further, inﬂation is set to 1%
which implies a nominal interest rate of 3% in the steady state.
Debt in the data corresponds to government bonds held by the private sector. I follow the calculation method in Del
Negro et al. (2011), and the US ﬂow-of-funds data points to about 60% debt-to-GDP ratio from 1950 to 2015. I also follow
their target ϕ ¼ 0:19 which seems to match the average turnover of non-government issued assets in the ﬂow-of-funds
data. The steady-state intermediation cost κ generates an annual liquidity premium (ΔLP) of 91 basis points, in line with
previous studies of non-defaultable components of corporate spreads in Longstaff et al. (2005). I set η¼ 1=2 so that the asset
price is qi ¼ 1:0641 and entrepreneurs are indeed ﬁnancing constrained. Then, τy ¼ 22:03% is pinned down by the gov-
ernment budget constraint (33).
The last parameter ψg is related to maximizing the social welfare. Note that the steady-state social utility is proportional
to UðcÞμNþψ gUðgÞ. The parameter ψg is set such that the calibrated g maximizes the social welfare with the calibrated
debt-to-GDP ratio. I discuss the details in the following.
4.2. The optimal debt-to-GDP ratio
To illustrate the optimal level of debt, I ﬁx the tax rate τy and plot the welfare gains in terms of equivalent consumption
goods relative to the economy with br=y¼ 0 (Fig. 1). I also plot consumption, investment, government expenditures, and
output as a function of br=y. These variables are also normalized to be 100% when br=y¼ 0.
A higher debt-to-GDP ratio (public liquidity provision) drives up the real interest rate and reduces the return difference
between liquid and illiquid assets (see the liquidity premium). Note that the “percentage spread”, qnqi
 
=qi, in general
also decreases with the public liquidity provision. That is, public liquidity provision mitigates the ﬁnancing constraints faced
by the entrepreneurs, and capital accumulation thus increases with a higher debt-to-GDP ratio.
With more public liquidity, workers search less private liquidity such that the equilibrium asset saleability falls. But at the
same time entrepreneurs are less ﬁnancing constrained, and the representative household is thus more willing to consume.
As consumption rises with the debt-to-GDP ratio, leisure increases (hours worked fall) because they are complements.
One interesting feature is that output is non-monotone. The drop of labor hours reduce output initially, but output rises
with the debt-to-GDP ratio because the cut in expenditures “crowds in” investment and production.
Importantly, although the public liquidity provision mitigates ﬁnancial frictions, the cut in government expenditures will
eventually reduce the social welfare with the rise of debt-to-GDP ratio (for a given ψg). The consumption-equivalence
welfare gains are about 1.1% if the debt-to-GDP ratio is 0.6 (the calibrated level) and about 0.6% if the debt-to-GDP ratio is
1.0. Therefore, the parameter ψg is chosen such that welfare is maximized at the calibrated debt-to-GDP ratio.
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1
is smaller than or equal to the
growth rate γz; the other has the opposite feature. When RΠ
1rγz, government expenditures can be ﬁnanced relatively
easily (recall Eq. (35)), as the size of the economy grows at a faster speed than the real interest rate. Therefore, government
expenditures increase with the debt-to-GDP ratio.
When γzoRΠ
1rβ1γσz , a higher debt-to-GDP ratio implies that the government expenditures share of GDP has to fall.
Note that the dotted line in the panel of (net) annualized real interest rate corresponds to 400ðβ1γσz 1Þ, and the (gross)
real interest rate never exceeds β1γσz . As the debt-to-GDP ratio rises, the government expenditures decrease at a faster
speed and ﬁnally overturn the welfare improvement from public liquidity provision. Therefore, the social welfare peaks at
the calibrated debt-to-GDP ratio (i.e., 0.60), while the expenditures peaks when the debt-to-GDP ratio is around 0.25.
In sum, facing liquidity frictions, the monetary authority prefers a higher real interest rate and public liquidity provision,
as it will attenuate liquidity frictions. Nevertheless, ﬁnancing government expenditures becomes more costly with a higher
real interest rate. The ﬁscal authority thus prefers a lower interest rate. The conﬂicts then imply both an optimal real interest
rate and an optimal level of government debt that balance the tradeoff.5. Equilibrium dynamics and monetary–ﬁscal interactions
I have illustrated the monetary–ﬁscal interactions in the steady state. This section presents equilibrium responses to
shocks under different policy rules and examines further the interactions. I use AR(1) processes for productivity shocks and
ﬁnancial shocks:
lnðAtÞ ¼ ρAlnðAt1ÞþϵA;t ; 0oρAo1
ln κt ¼ ρκ lnðκt1Þþð1ρκÞlnκþϵκ;t ; 0oρκo1
where ϵA;t Nð0;σ2AÞ (IID over time), ϵκ;t Nð0;σ2κÞ (IID over time), and the two innovations are uncorrelated. TFP shocks
directly affect the efﬁciency of production, while ﬁnancial shocks directly affect the cost of intermediation (search and
matching) and the ﬁnancial market.
First, I study a special and simple class of rules in (24), in which the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate
only as a function of inﬂation, while the ﬁscal authority adjusts taxes in response to the level of real government debt
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
ψ
ψ
Region I: AM + AF
Region II: PM + PF
Region III: AM + PF / PM + AF
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W. Cui / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 1–2514outstanding. The simple rules are fairly standard in the literature. Then, I move to discuss the scenario when the government
is able to follow the full set of rules in (24).
5.1. A simple class of monetary and ﬁscal rules
Suppose government expenditures are ﬁxed at the steady-state level and the interest rate policy only responds to
inﬂation. That is,
ψ gb ¼ 0; ψ gy ¼ 0; ψRy ¼ 0
and only ψτb and ψRΠ are allowed to be non-zero. The policy parameter pair (ψτb, ψRΠ) then determines whether a locally
stable equilibrium around the steady state exists and whether it is unique. For discussion simplicity, I focus on ψτb40 and
ψRΠ40, which are suggested by actual policies.
I log-linearize the system,7 and then I check the number of eigenvalues that lie outside the unit circle against the number
of forward looking variables. When the two numbers are the same, a unique stable equilibrium exists (see Blanchard and
Kahn, 1980). When the number of forward looking variables is larger, a locally stable equilibrium is not determined. When
the number of eigenvalues that lie outside the unit circle is larger, a stable equilibrium does not exist. The policy parameter
space ψτb; ψRΠ
 
can then be divided into three disjoint regions (Fig. 2).
In region III, we have a unique saddle-path equilibrium. When both ψRΠ and ψτb are large, one can think of the case in
which the monetary authority actively pursues price stability and the ﬁscal authority adjusts tax strongly to accommodate.
That is, the ﬁscal policy obeys the constraints imposed by the economy and the monetary authority. This could generate a
unique stable equilibrium. When both ψRΠ and ψτb are small, one can think of the case in which the ﬁscal authority does not
respond to the level of debt strongly, preventing deﬁcit from being ﬁnanced entirely with future taxes, and the monetary
authority accommodates by not responding to inﬂation strongly. This could also generate a unique stable equilibrium.
In region I, ψRΠ is relatively large and ψτb is relatively small (compared to those in region III). The monetary authority
actively responds to inﬂation, while the ﬁscal authority does not generate sufﬁcient tax revenues when the level of real
government debt is high. This produces too many unstable roots in the log-linearized system, and we do not have a stable
equilibrium. In contrast, in region II, ψRΠ is relatively small and ψτb is relatively large (compared to those in region III). The
monetary authority does not actively responds to inﬂation, while the ﬁscal authority generates relatively large tax revenues
when the level of real government debt is high. This produces too few unstable roots, and the system is thus indeterminate.
This division is similar to Leeper (1991), who points out that both monetary policy and ﬁscal policy can be labeled as
either active or passive. Being active means that the authority is forward looking and is not constrained by the current
government budget constraint; it is free to choose a rule. Being passive means that it is backward looking and is constrained
by the active authority and the private agents' behaviors. An economy system has a locally unique stable equilibrium if and
only if one authority is active and the other authority is passive.
Therefore, region I is the active monetary–active ﬁscal (AM þ AF) regime, while region II is the passive monetary–passive
ﬁscal (PM þ PF) regime. Region III combines both active monetary–passive ﬁscal (AM þ PF) and passive monetary–active
ﬁscal (PM þ AF) regimes.7 Details available upon request.
W. Cui / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 1–25 15The regime division in Fig. 2 features non-linear boundaries. When ψτb increases, the boundary ψRΠ of region I also
increases. That is, when the ﬁscal authority is more responsive to debt burden (as ψτb increases), the monetary authority can
set an even higher interest rate when inﬂation rises and still maintain a stable equilibrium. This intuition is also reﬂected in
the boundary ψRΠ of region II, which also increases with ψτb. That is, when the ﬁscal authority is more responsive to debt
burden, the monetary authority has to pay more attention to inﬂation; otherwise, both authorities balance the government
budget such that a locally stable equilibrium is not uniquely determined.
The reason for such non-linear region boundaries is that liquidity frictions together with sticky prices generate non-
trivial inﬂation and liquidity premium dynamics after shocks. The monetary–ﬁscal interaction is more complicated than a
model without liquidity frictions. Next, I discuss the details.
5.2. Simple policy rules and shocks
I now assign values to productivity shocks and ﬁnancial shocks. To calibrate the two shocks, it is reasonable to impose the
economy under an active monetary–passive ﬁscal rule
ψRΠ ¼ 1:5; ψτb ¼ 0:015
As is common in the New Keynesian literature, ψRΠ ¼ 1:5 is a usual number which captures the experience of the post-war
US economy. Given ψRΠ ¼ 1:5, the lowest possible ψτb is about 0.015 in the AM þ PF regime.
To compare productivity and ﬁnancial shocks, the persistence and standard deviation of the underlying shock processes
target the volatility (0.02) and the ﬁrst-order correlation (0.91) of GDP's cyclical components (HP ﬁltered with a smoothing
coefﬁcient of 1600). When using only productivity shocks, I obtain
ρA ¼ 0:92; σA ¼ 0:0088
When focusing on shocks to intermediation costs only, the exercise yields
ρκ ¼ 0:91; σκ ¼ 0:09
I use these parameters in the subsequent numerical simulations. By design, both shocks will generate very similar aggregate
output dynamics, and one can thus focus on the differences in the paths of other variables. Because of the log-linearization,
the risk premium is removed and the premium Δt
LP
captures only liquidity premium.
Now, consider a one standard deviation drop in ϵA;t (negative TFP shocks) and a one standard deviation increase in ϵκ;t
(adverse ﬁnancial shocks that raise intermediation costs). Both shocks can generate many features of a recession: a drop of
output, consumption, and investment. Compared to TFP shocks, ﬁnancial shocks generate “ﬂight to liquidity”, which is
reﬂected in the rise of liquidity premium. Financial shocks imply that outside ﬁnancing is more costly, and therefore having
liquid assets (as a hedge for future investment) becomes more attractive. Then, demand for private claims falls, and
entrepreneurs ﬁnd it even harder to search for potential buyers.
On the contrary, when there are only negative TFP shocks, the return from investment is persistently low and the need
for investment drops. Therefore, negative TFP shocks reduce liquid assets' hedging value for future investment (given that
there are no ﬁnancial shocks). The difference can be clearly seen in the liquidity premium dynamics after the two shocks.
Adverse ﬁnancial shocks push up liquidity premium, while negative TFP shocks do the opposite.
After the ﬁnancial shocks, ﬂight to liquidity pushes up liquidity premium which dominates the increase of marginal
product of capital such that asset price falls. This channel avoids the rise of asset price generated by an exogenous fall of ϕ as
noted by Bigio (2012) and Shi (2015). TFP shocks, however, generate smaller declines in asset saleability in the initial
periods. This is because a persistent lower TFP, albeit pushing down liquidity premium, reduces rental rates of capital and
also generates persistent falls in the demand for private claims and asset price.
Note that asset price and asset liquidity affect investment, since entrepreneurs use the ﬁnancial market to leverage their
net worth for investment projects. The drop of asset price qi and saleability ϕ tightens entrepreneurs' ﬁnancing constraints.
That is why ﬁnancial shocks have a signiﬁcant impact on investment (with a 5% initial drop) compared to TFP shocks (with a
3% initial drop).
Together with the ﬂight to liquidity after adverse ﬁnancial shocks, inﬂation falls sharply to 0.15% and the monetary
authority lowers the nominal interest rate from 3% to 1.8%. On the contrary, negative TFP shocks generate higher
inﬂation rates (to 1.5% initially) like in many other New Keynesian models, as total resources become scarce and nominal
prices have to go up. Observing a higher inﬂation rate, the monetary authority raises the nominal interest rate to 3.7%.
Since the real interest rate rises and the total tax revenues fall with output persistently, the growth rate of government
debt (see the “Debt Growth” panel in Fig. 3) is persistently higher than the steady-state level to ﬁnance government
expenditures.8
Note that the consumption movement after ﬁnancial shocks is affected by nominal rigidities. In the previous literature
without sticky prices, investment and consumption usually move in opposite directions after negative ﬁnancial shocks
(Kiyotaki and Moore, 2012 and Shi, 2015). The drop of output is small and only limited to the forgone capital accumulation.
With nominal rigidities, “ﬂight to liquidity” reduces inﬂation and increases real wages. Intermediate goods ﬁrms thus ﬁnd it8 The growth rate of government debt supply is BtBt  1 ¼
Bt=Pt
Bt  1=Pt  1
Πt ¼ Br;tBr;t  1Πt ¼
br;t
br;t  1
γzΠt .
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Fig. 3. Impulse responses after one standard deviation innovations in TFP and intermediation costs.
W. Cui / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 1–2516optimal to reduce labor hours. Then, output falls immediately together with a sharp decline of investment. That is why
consumption does not need to rise and move in the opposite direction of investment (except for the ﬁrst two periods as we
have a moderate degree of price stickiness).
After ﬁnancial shocks, workers invest more in liquid assets which are not backed by real investment. Therefore, capital
accumulation signiﬁcantly slows down and the total net worth of the economy falls, which further exacerbates the ﬁnancing
situation of entrepreneurs in the future. Anticipating this, workers further ﬂy to liquidity which causes persistent reduction
of investment, consumption, and output.
5.3. The impact of zero lower bound after ﬁnancial shocks
The previous exercise suggests that the nominal interest rate could drop below zero, when adverse ﬁnancial shocks are
large enough to generate a high deﬂationary pressure. Nevertheless, the zero lower bound (ZLB) seems to be a crucial
technical constraint, as agents will prefer to hold money if the nominal rate is below zero. In my model, the ZLB will be
important as product prices are sticky. If constrained by the ZLB, which is a hard constraint,9 the nominal interest rate can
further affect policies and the real economy activities.
To illustrate, I modify the simple interest rate rule in the previous section to
Rt ¼max 0; R
Πt
Π
 ψRΠ 
When the ﬁnancial shocks are large, i.e., a four standard deviation increase in ϵκ;t , the ZLB constrains the nominal interest9 Several central banks, including the Swiss National Bank and the Bank of Japan, have recently implemented negative nominal policy rates. In practice,
slightly negative nominal rates are possible due to reasons such as regulations on holding government bonds. Nevertheless, large negative policy rates are
unlikely, and the ZLB should be interpreted as some negative lower bound that is not far away from zero.
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W. Cui / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 1–25 17rate at zero for almost one year after the shocks (Fig. 4).10 The dash-dot lines are the equilibrium responses in the absence of
ZLB, while the sold lines are the counterparts when the ZLB is respected.
A monetary authority following the simple Taylor-type rule in (24) would have lowered the nominal interest rate to
almost 2%, thereby inducing a fall in the real interest rate from the steady-state level 2% into the negative territory. In
contrast, when the ZLB is respected, the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero for one year. Consumption, investment, and
output fall by another 0.75%, 11%, and 2% compared to the case when the ZLB is not in presence.
Importantly, the ZLB ampliﬁes the effect of ﬁnancial shocks: the constraint is binding in a given period, and agents expect it
to be binding in the future. This belief lowers expected future income and net worth and generates deﬂationary expectations.
Such expectation leads to a rise in real rates and a fall in demand. Therefore, workers prefer to save in liquid government
bonds and reduce consumption further. This again reduces the demand for private claims and their saleability, and entre-
preneurs ﬁnd it even harder to ﬁnance investment projects. As a result, asset price drops signiﬁcantly more if the ZLB binds.
Note that the ZLB brings up the real interest rate when inﬂation falls, and the ﬁscal authority needs to raise more taxes and issue
more government debt to ﬁnance the interest payments. This effect further distorts the economy. Liquidity premium increases less
when the ZLB binds, reﬂecting that the ﬁscal authority ﬁnds it more costly to ﬁnance government expenditures.
The above exercise complements the studies by Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Buera and Nicolini (2014) in which
they argue that the hit of ZLB is because of tightening of borrowing constraints. Here, adverse ﬁnancial shocks are similar to
the tightening of borrowing constraints as issuing and/or reselling assets are harder and more costly. Agents ﬂy to liquidity,
reduce aggregate demand, and push down inﬂation. Then, the monetary authority signiﬁcantly reduces the nominal interest
rate, which could stay at zero for a long period of time.
5.4. Optimal simple and sophisticated policy rules
Finally, I also let government expenditures and the nominal interest rate to respond as speciﬁed in (24). I label this type
of policy rules as the sophisticated rules, in order to distinguish from the simple rules in previous analysis in which
ψ gb ¼ψ gy ¼ψRy ¼ 0.10 I use the algorithm in Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) to solve the model with the ZLB.
Table 3
Optimal policy parameters in response to ﬁnancial shocks, given ψτb ¼ 0:015.
Rule⧹parameters ψRΠ ψ

Ry ψ

gb ψ

gy
The simple rules 2.71 0 0 0
The sophisticated rules 3.10 0.21 0.32 0.24
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W. Cui / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 1–2518In particular, I search for the optimal sophisticated rules. In doing so, I ﬁrst approximate the average household utility by
a second-order Taylor expansion (see Appendix C), which depends on the deviation of output, inﬂation, consumption,
investment, and government expenditures from their steady-state levels.11 Then, I search the optimal policy parameters
ψ RΠ ; ψ

Ry; ψ

gb, and ψ

gy, which maximize the social welfare subject to the log-linearized system.
Since the unconditional expectation of average household utility can be expressed as the weighted unconditional var-
iances of output, inﬂation, consumption, investment, and government expenditures, I search for the coefﬁcients which
minimize the unconditional variances. As a comparison, I also compute the optimal policy parameters when the govern-
ment is constrained to the simple rules. The difference can be seen from the optimal policy parameters in Table 3.
When government expenditures can be adjusted in response to ﬁnancial shocks, the ﬁscal authority increases spending
when output falls (ψ gy ¼ 0:24o0) and reduces spending when the real level of debt becomes large (ψgb ¼ 0:32o0). In11 When I approximate the utility function, I ignore the ZLB because of the complication of computing second-order derivatives. However, because of
the optimal mix of monetary and ﬁscal policies, the nominal interest rates will not hit the ZLB even after a four standard deviation shock.
W. Cui / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 1–25 19general, the ﬁscal policy becomes more passive or more accommodating, as the changes of government debt is much larger
than the changes of output (see Fig. 5). That is why the monetary authority can be more responsive to inﬂation to reduce the
interest payments on government debt (i.e., ψ RΠ increases from 2.71 to 3.10).
Fig. 5 shows the equilibrium dynamics after a four standard deviation drop in ϵκ;t , under the simple rules with ψRΠ ¼ 1:5
(solid lines) and the optimal sophisticated rules (dashed lines) respectively. The monetary authority under both policy rules
react strongly to inﬂation. But the sophisticated policy rules, with more ﬁscal instruments, stabilize most macro variables.
One also sees that inﬂation is stable under the sophisticated policy rules, which is particularly welfare-enhancing. As
inﬂation is stabilized, nominal rates never touch the ZLB, and the distortion of nominal price dispersion arising from
nominal price rigidity is thus negligible.
Under the sophisticated rules, the government implements ﬁscal contraction after adverse ﬁnancial shocks, except for
the ﬁscal expansion in the ﬁrst two periods. To do so, government expenditures increase initially (as output falls on impact
and ψgyo0), and then decrease persistently below the steady-state level (as the real debt is higher than the steady-state
level and ψ gbo0). The initial rise of government expenditures generates inﬂation due to the price stickiness environment
through the standard New-Keynesian demand channel. The initial 0.4% increase of government expenditures avoids almost
3% drop of output under the simple rules.
One might view that ﬁscal expansion is always helpful in stabilizing inﬂation, since it can raise aggregate demand when
inﬂation is low. This point is argued by Christiano et al. (2011) and Woodford (2011) when nominal interest rates are at the
ZLB. Nevertheless, anticipated ﬁscal contraction can also raise aggregate demand when entrepreneurs are ﬁnancing con-
strained. Agents expect that future ﬁscal contraction gives back resources to entrepreneurs, thus relaxing ﬁnancing con-
straints and raising the demand for investment in the future. Workers are more willing to search for investment projects,
relaxing entrepreneurs' ﬁnancing constraints today. Therefore, entrepreneurs can invest more today, and households
accumulate more capital and ﬁnd themselves richer in the future, which further encourages workers to search for
investment projects today.
That is, in the simulation, the ﬁscal contraction's effect dominates the ﬁscal expansion's effect in raising demand, as
endogenous ﬁnancing constraints are powerful in ampliﬁcation. The important consequence of this transmission is that
inﬂation is stabilized even if the economy is hit by large ﬁnancial shocks.
The monetary–ﬁscal interactions can be further seen from the difference in the dynamics of real debt. Under the simple
rules, as the ZLB constrains nominal interest rates, the deﬂationary pressure drives up the real debt burden signiﬁcantly.
Recall the government budget constraint
gþR1br;1
Π
¼ τyyþγzbr
and we know that a fall in Π together with a ﬁxed g implies that τy needs to increase. Although the fall of inﬂation implies
that there is more public liquidity, the fall is unnecessarily large such that the distortionary taxation increases signiﬁcantly
as in Fig. 5. The rise of government debt is thus involuntary.
Under the sophisticated policy rules, however, inﬂation is stable and real interest rates drop after shocks. That is why
liquidity premium increases more than that under the simple policy rules while the real debt burden only increases slightly.
The tradeoff between the beneﬁt of public liquidity provision and the cost of government ﬁnancing is less severe when agents
ﬂy to liquidity and government expenditures fall. The increase of the real value of debt is mostly from the voluntary drop of
government expenditures, instead of from the drop of nominal price levels. By using ﬁscal contraction, the government
maintains a healthy increase of public liquidity provision. As a result, the rise in distortionary taxation is moderate (Fig. 5).
In sum, the monetary authority is more active than what the simple rules imply. However, it is unlikely constrained by
the ZLB even if the economy is hit by very large ﬁnancial shocks. Although the government is constrained by policy rules in
the model, a careful mix of monetary and ﬁscal policies can avoid the deep recession generated by liquidity frictions and
the ZLB.
Remark: I do not analyze the optimal taxation in these policy experiments. First, ﬁxing the tax rule is relatively simple.
Perhaps, in practice, it is indeed hard to change taxation within a short period of time, while adjusting government expen-
ditures is easier. Second, if the ﬁscal authority can adjust tax rules, one might view that it is better to provide real liquidity
right after shocks by promising higher tax rates in the future. However, it is unlikely that such policy is better than the
sophisticated rules, since it requires a higher level of distortionary taxation and is subject to more severe commitment issues.6. Conclusion
I illustrate the importance of monetary–ﬁscal interactions with endogenous liquidity frictions. In particular, the tradeoff
between the beneﬁt of public liquidity provision and the cost of ﬁnancing government expenditures implies an optimal
long-run supply of government debt. In combating large adverse ﬁnancial shocks, the proper mix of monetary and ﬁscal
policies can avoid the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates under a simple Taylor rule.
For simplicity, the paper assumes government debt as a blend of non-interest and interest bearing liabilities. Future
research can give an explicit role for ﬁat currency and/or reserves of central banks. At the same time, I assume “private
claims” as an amalgam of privately issued equity and debt. One could further analyze a more realistic capital structure and
W. Cui / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 1–2520the implication for monetary–ﬁscal interactions. Finally, further work could also focus on the government commitment
issues (for example illustrated in Bassetto, 2005) when government debt provides liquidity services.Acknowledgment
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agreement N° 649396).Appendix A. The transformed economy
Along the balanced growth path, all quantity variables (except Nt) and the wage rate grow at the same rate γz, while
interest rate, inﬂation, and asset price are constants. Therefore, I deﬂate all quantity variables by Zt. In the following, I collect
all competitive equilibrium conditions for (ct, xt, Nt, yt, kt, br;t ρt, ϕt, qt
n
, qt
i
, wt, rt, Πt, λt, ht
1
, ht
2
), given state variables (kt1,
br;t1, Rt1, κt, At, Zt) and policy rules (gt, τt
y
, Rt).
1. Optimal conditions from households:
cþqnγzkþγzbr ¼wNþ χρþð1χÞqn
 
1δ k1þ χρþð1χÞ  rk1þR1br;1Π þ 1τy  1λ y
 

ð36Þ
cσt ð1τyt Þλtð1αÞyt ¼ μNt ð37Þ
Et
βγσz c
σ
tþ1
cσt
χρtþ1þ 1χ
  
rtþ1þð1δÞ χρtþ1þð1χÞqntþ1
 
qnt
 

¼ 1 ð38Þ
Et
βγσz c
σ
tþ1
cσt
Rt
Πtþ1
χρtþ1þ1χ
  
¼ 1 ð39Þ
xt ¼ χ
rtþqitϕt 1δ
  
kt1þ
Rt1
Πt
br;t1þ 1τyt
 
1λ yt
1ϕtqit
ð40Þ
2. The ﬁnancial market in equilibrium:
ρt ¼
ð1ϕtÞqnt
1ϕtqit
; ð41Þ
qit ¼ 1þκt 1þ
ηξ
1
η 1
1ηϕ
η
1 η
t 1ϕt
  1
ϕt
" #
ð42Þ
κt ϕ
1
t þϕ
η
1 η
t ξ
1
η 1
 

¼ qnt qit ð43Þ
3. Optimal conditions from ﬁrms:
rt ¼ ð1τ
y
t Þλtαyt
kt1
; wt ¼ ð1τ
y
t Þλtð1αÞyt
Nt
ð44Þ
h1t ¼ λtytþEt
βψγσz c
σ
tþ1
cσt
Πtþ1
Π
 1þ ζ
ζ
h1tþ1
" #
ð45Þ
h2t ¼ ytþψE
βψγσz c
σ
tþ1
cσt
Πtþ1
Π
 1
ζ
h2tþ1
" #
ð46Þ
W. Cui / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 1–25 211¼ 1ψ  1þζ h1t
h2t
" #1=ζ
þψ Π
Πt
" #1=ζ
ð47Þ
4. Market clearing:
yt ¼ Atkαt1N1αt ð48Þ
xt ¼ γzktð1δÞkt1 ð49Þ
ctþgtþxtþκt 1þξ
1
η 1ϕ
1
1 η
t
 
xtþχð1δÞkt1
 ¼ yt ð50Þ
Next, I illustrate how to compute the optimal steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio, by ﬁxing the tax rate τy. Note that we do
not need to know the steady-state inﬂation and nominal interest rate separately. Let ~Rþ  R=Π þ be the real interest rate.
Given a br=y (which will be chosen optimally later), I guess an asset saleability ϕ and know that f ¼ϕ
η
η 1ξ
1
1 η. Then, I solve
qn, qi, and ρ from (41), (42), and (43)
qi ¼ 1þκ 1þηξ
1
η 1
1ηϕ
η
1 η 1ϕ
 
 1
ϕ
" #
qn ¼ qiþκ 1
f
þ 1
ϕ
 !
ρ ¼ q
n
qr
¼ q
nð1ϕÞ
1ϕqi
The steady-state real interest rate ~R and the (after-tax) capital return r are obtained from (38) and (39):
~R ¼ γ
σ
z
β χρþ1χ 
r ¼ q
nγσz =βð1δÞ χρþð1χÞqn
 
χρþð1χÞ ð51Þ
With the knowledge of ~R , we know from the government budget constraint (implied by Walras law) that
g
y
¼ τyþðγz ~R Þ
br
y
Using the knowledge of Cobb–Douglas production function, I compute the steady-state capital-to-output ratio
k
y
¼ αð1τ
yÞλ
r
We are ready to check the initial guess of ϕ, since (40) and (49) imply that the capital-to-output ratio satisﬁes
k
y
¼ χ
~Rbry þχ 1λ
 
1τy 
ð1ϕqiÞ ~δ½rþϕqið1δÞχ
h i
If yes, the correct ϕ is found; if not, ϕ should be adjusted.
Now, I compute c=y from the goods market clearing condition (50)
c
y
¼ 1g
y
 ~δþκ ϕ
f
þ1
 !
~δþð1δÞχ
h i" #k
y
With the tax rate, the steady-state (after-tax) wage rate is w ¼ 1τy λ 1αð Þ r
αð1 τyÞλ
h i α
α 1, and from the labor supply
condition (37) we know that
c ¼
1τy λ 1αð Þ r
αð1 τyÞλ
h i α
α 1
μ
2
64
3
75
1
σ
; y ¼ c=c
y
; g ¼ g
y
y
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N ¼ ð1τ
yÞλð1αÞy
w
Finally, I compute the steady-state social welfare. The per-period utility is given by
Z1σ
c1σ
1σμNþ
g1σ
1σ
 
Then, given an initial Z0, one knows that Zt ¼ Z0 γz
 t and the steady-state welfare becomes
ð1βγ1σz Þ1Z1σ0
c1σ
1σμNþ
g1σ
1σ
 !
I pick the br=y that maximizes the above steady-state welfare.Appendix B. Proofs
B.1. Price setting of intermediate goods ﬁrms
I follow the proof of Ascari (2004). When ﬁrm i is setting the price at time t, it takes into account the fact that its price
grows with the steady-state inﬂationΠ , if it is not allowed to change the price in the future. Therefore, the per-period proﬁt
is Pi;tΠ
sYi;tþ s=Ptþ sMCi;tþ sYi;tþ s where MCi;tþ s is the real marginal cost. By using the fact that Yi;tþ s ¼ Ytþ s Pi;tΠ
s
Ptþ s
  1þ ζζ
, I
write down the problem of the ﬁrm as
max
fPit g
Et
X1
s ¼ 0
ψ sΔt;tþ s
Pi;tΠ
s
Ptþ s
 ! 1ζ
Ytþ sMCi;tþ sYi;tþ s
2
4
3
5
2
4
3
5
where Δt;tþ s is the stochastic discount factor between time t and time tþs, and MCi;tþ s ¼ λtþ s since we are looking at the
symmetric equilibrium. The optimal price Pit ¼ Pt is
Pt ¼ 1þζ
 EtP1s ¼ 0 ψ sΔt;tþ sλtþ s Pt þ sΠ s
 1þ ζ
ζ Ytþ s
Et
P1
s ¼ 0 ψ sΔt;tþ s
Pt þ s
Π
s
 1
ζYtþ s
Notice that Ptþ s ¼ Pt þ sPt þ s 1
Ptþ s 1
Ptþ s 2
…Pt þ 1Pt Pt and Ptþ s=Pt ¼Πtþ sΠtþ s1…Πtþ1, and I can simplify the above identity to
Pt
Pt
¼ 1þζ Et
P1
s ¼ 0 ψ
sΔt;tþ sλtþ s Πt þ sΠt þ s 1…Πtþ 1
Π
s
 1þ ζ
ζ Ytþ s
Et
P1
s ¼ 0 ψ sΔt;tþ s
Πt þ sΠtþ s 1…Πt þ 1
Π
s
 1
ζYtþ s
Finally, let H1t ¼ λtYtþψE Δtþ1 Πt þ 1Π
 1þ ζ
ζ H1tþ1 Γt

				
"
and H2t ¼ YtþψE Δtþ1 Πt þ 1Π
 1
ζH2tþ1
 

. I can rewrite the above equation
recursively as Pt =Pt ¼ ð1þζÞH1t =H2t as in the main text.
B.2. Proof of optimal ðϕ; qiÞ pair
Since κf þ κϕ¼ qnqi, then 1ϕqi ¼ κ 1þ
ϕ
f
 
þ1ϕqn and
qr ¼ 1ϕq
i
1ϕ ¼
κ 1þϕf
 
þ1ϕqn
1ϕ
To minimize qr, I derive the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to ϕ:
dqrðϕÞ
dϕ
¼
1ϕ  κð1ηÞfqnh iþ κ 1þϕf þ1ϕqnh i
ð1ϕÞ2
¼ 0 ð52Þ
where I have used the fact that f ¼ ξ 11 ηϕ
η
η 1. Rearranging, I obtain
qn ¼ 1þκ 1þ 1ϕð1ηÞf þ
ϕ
f
 

ð53Þ
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qi ¼ qnκ
f
 κ
ϕ
¼ 1þκ 1þηð1ϕÞð1ηÞf 
1
ϕ
 

as shown in the main text. I also check the second-order condition to ensure minimization (available upon request).
B.3. Proof of Proposition 1:
If κ40 and private claims and government bonds co-exist, ρ ¼ 1þχ1 β ~R Þ
1
γσz 1
 

41

from the Euler equation for
bonds (39). The steady-state liquidity premium can be written as
Δ
LP ¼ χrniþ ð1χÞr
nn
ρ
þ 1χ  1ρ1 rnn ~R ¼ ρ1β1γσz  ~Rþ 1χ  1ρ1 rnn
¼ ρ1ðχρþ1χÞ ~R ~Rþð1χÞ 1ρ1
 
rnn ¼ ð1χÞð1ρ1Þ rnn ~R
 
¼ ð1χÞð1ρ1Þ r=qnþ1δ ~R
 
where I have used (38) in the second equality. Further using (26) and (27), we know that
χρþ1χ rþ χρþ 1χ qn ð1δÞ ¼ β1γσz qn ¼ ~R ðχρþ1χÞqn
Therefore, r=qn ¼ ~R
χρ
qn
þ 1χð Þqn
h i
χρþ1χ 1δ
 
and the steady-state liquidity premium becomes
Δ
LP ¼ 1χ  1ρ1  1δ
χρ
qn
þ 1χ qn 

χρþ1χ 1δ
 
0
BB@
1
CCA¼ 1χ  1ρ1  1δ  χρχρþ1χ 1 1qn
 
40:
B.4. Proof of Proposition 2:
The spread is Δs ¼ qnqi ¼ κ 1ϕþ1f
 
and the partial derivative
∂Δs
∂ϕ
¼ κ  1
ϕ2
þ η
1η
1
ϕf
" #
where I have used the fact that f ¼ ξ 11 ηϕ
η
η 1. Then, ∂Δ
s
∂ϕo0 is equivalent to
1
ϕ
 η
1η f40 ð54Þ
Since 0oϕo1, we know that if ∂Δs∂ϕo0 then
∂qi
∂ϕ
¼ η
1η
η
1η
1ϕ
ϕf
1
f
 

þ 1
ϕ2
¼ η
2
ð1ηÞ2
1ϕ
ϕf
þ 1
ϕ2
 ηð1ηÞf40
by using (54).Appendix C. Second-order approximation of welfare
Let ~z denotes the log-deviation of zt from its steady-state level z. That is, zt ¼ ze~zt . Deﬁne
~β  βγ1σz
so that ~β is the discount factor when we detrend all variables. Take the Taylor expansion of utility of consumption about its
steady state
c1σt 1
1σ 
c1σ1
1σ þc
1σ ~ctþ
ð1σÞ
2
~c2t
 

Similarly, I derive
ψ g
g1σt 1
1σ ψ g
g1σ1
1σ þψ gg
1σ ~gtþ
ð1σÞ
2
~g2t
 

; μNt  μNþμN ~Ntþ
1
2
~N
2
t
 
W. Cui / European Economic Review 87 (2016) 1–2524Notice that labor demand from individual ﬁrm i is lit ¼ λð1αÞYit~Wt ¼
yit
At ðkt 1=Nt Þα and yit ¼ yt
Pit
Pt
  1þ ζζ , then
Nt ¼ yt
At kt1=Nt
 α
Z
Pit
Pt
  1þ ζζ
di; 1αð Þ ~Nt ¼ ~htþ ~Σ t
where ht  yt=At=kαt1 and Σt  log
R Pit
Pt
  1þ ζζ di. Therefore, I can rewrite the second order approximation of period utility
as
U ct ;Nt ; gt
   μN
1α
~htþ ~ztþ
1
2ð1αÞ
~h
2
t
 

þc1σ ~ctþ
ð1σÞ
2
~c2t
 

þþψ gg1σ ~gtþ
ð1σÞ
2
~g2t
 

þt:i:p
where t:i:p indicates terms that are independent of policy (note: the steady-state government targets are ﬁxed).
Further, I deﬁne yet  ctþgt as the total expenditures of private consumption and government expenditures, and take the
second-order approximation of yt
e
θc ~ctþ
1
2
θcð~ctÞ2þθg ~gtþ
1
2
θg ~g
2
t ¼ ~yet þ
1
2
~yet
 2
where θc and θg denote the consumption share and the government-expenditure share of total expenditures. After sub-
stituting ~gt , I rewrite Ut ¼Uðct ;Nt ; gtÞ
Ut   μN1α
~htþ1α
 2
2ð1αÞ þ
~Σ t
2
64
3
75þc1σ ~ctþð1σÞ2 ~c2t
 

þ ψ gg
1σ
θg
ð1σÞθg
2
~g2t þ ~yet þ
1
2
ð ~yet Þ2
1
2
θg ~g
2
t θc ~ct
1
2
θc ~c
2
t
 

þt:i:p
¼  μN
1α
~htþ1α
 2
2ð1αÞ þ
~Σ t
2
64
3
75 θcθgψ gg
1σþc1σ σ1ð Þ
2
~ctc1σ θcθgψ gg
1σ
θc
θg
ψ gg
1σ þc
1σ σ1ð Þ
2
4
3
52
 ψ gg
1σσ
2
~g2t þ
ψ gg
1σ
2θg
~yitþ1
h i2
þt:i:p
I approximate ~Σ t  ð1þζÞ2ζ varif log Pitg by following the proof in Gali and Monacelli (2005). Further, following Woodford
(2003), we have
X1
t ¼ 0
~β
t
varif log Pitg ¼
ψ
ð1ψ Þð1 ~βψ Þ
X1
t ¼ 0
~β
t ~Π
2
t
Therefore, the second-order approximation of total utility of the representative household is
E0
X1
t ¼ 0
~β
t
Ut  
1
2
E0
X1
t ¼ 0
~β
tfλh ~htþ1α
 2
þλΠ ~Π
2
t þλc
~ctc1σ θcθgψ gg
1σ
θc
θg
ψ gg
1σ þc
1σ σ1ð Þ
2
4
3
5
2
þλg ~g2t þλyð ~yet þ1Þ2gþt:i:p:
λh ¼
μN
1αð Þ2
; λΠ ¼
μNψ ð1þζÞ
ð1αÞð1ψ Þð1 ~βψ Þζ
;
λc ¼
θc
θg
ψ gg
1σþc1σ σ1ð Þ λg ¼ψ gg1σσ; λy ¼ 
ψ gg
1σ
θg
A welfare-maximizing policy maximizes the utility function above. In addition, an optimal policy that commits to the rules
speciﬁed in the main text minimizes the variance of ~ht , ~Π t , ~ct , ~gt , and ~y
e
t , with weights λh, λΠ , λc, λg, and λy, subject to all
equilibrium conditions in Appendix A (in log-linearized forms).Appendix D. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this paper can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euro
ecorev.2016.03.007.References
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